standing EE loans were delinquent, repre-
by Contgress in 1978. he prpvimary purpose cation of EE loan funds at the state level and of the program was to provide credit to farmers who were unable to obtain credit from on the expansionary effect of the program on the farm credit market. The initial stimuli normal lenders due to economic stress. Over the farm credit market. The initial stimuli for the research were findings of the U.S. six billion dollars of EE loans were extended for the research ee f s of te nationally during fiscal years 1978 through GneralAccountng Officethasuggestedthat allocation of EE funds may have conflicted 1981. This paper examines the allocation of with the intent of the enabling legislation EE loans at the state level and the expan-and that EE funds may have displaced credit sionary effect of the program on farm credit that uld have been forhcming frm nr markets. Empirical evidence is provided that mal sources (United States GAO (b)) Given EE funds were allocated to states consistently e crease seerity of the farm financial with the general criteria cited in the develitatin tday and d es the ar aa opment of the EE program and that the EE iu differ s in he program expanded farm credit markets rather nde and strctre programs currently than displacing loans from other sources.
these are not primary concerns of the 1985 emergency credit deKey words: Economic Emergency loans, farm bate. Analysis of the 1978 program may, howcredit, Farmers Home Adminis-ever, provide insights into the effect of that tration. program on the current farm financial situ--'A~~~~~~~~ ~ation.
Arguments for emergency farm credit programs in 1985 are similar to those made prior to passage of the Emergency Agricul-EMERGENCY AGRICULTURAL CREDIT tural Credit Adjustment Act of 1978. Farmers ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 1978 are in financial distress, many face bankruptcy, and "sufficient" credit from normal Effective Augustrat , 1978, the Farmers lenders is apparently not forthcoming. Parome instaton as uthored adoxically, the 1985 situation appears more to in ing lns to farmers under the severe than that in 1978, due to the contin-provisions of Public Law 95-334, the Emerued deterioration of the financial status of n Agricultural Credit Adjustment Act of farmers. However, the prospects for emer-1978. FmHA was authorized to guarantee gency aid are not good due to the large loans made by private lenders and to provide federal budget deficits and the free market insured EE loans directly to farmers from federal budget deficits and the free market revolving funds maintained by the FmHA. , 1979 , credit program was non-expansionary, if EE 1980 , and comprised funds were used to restructure existing debt approximately.6 percent, 15.4 percent, 14.1 or to displace new higher cost debt from percent, and 6.3 percent of the total change normal lenders, the increased liquidity would in agricultural debt in the United States in have been obtained without reducing the these years (Ingram) .
solvency of EE borrowers. If the program was One perspective for analysis of the 1978 expansionary and total debt levels increased program is related to the operation of the more than they would have in the absence program -was it administered consistently of the program, debt-equity ratios and debt with the intent of the legislation? Questions servicing requirements would have increased about the administration of the program arise because of the program, worsening longrun from the absence of explicit allocation guide-survival prospects. In making the liquidity/ lines for the distribution of funds, and from solvency trade-off with an emergency loan the ambiguity of general guidelines such as program, it is naturally hoped that farm inmaking funds available under conditions of come and equity levels will increase to avoid "tight" credit or in the case of unavailability the negative effects of the decline in solof funds at "reasonable" rates from normal vency. Unfortunately, the 1978 EE program lenders. A General Accounting Office (GAO) has been followed by declines in income and investigation of a sample of individual EE equity values in agriculture, making the deloans from selected states (United States GAO dine in solvency associated with an expansionary emergency credit program relevant (b)) found some evidence of EE loans that sionary emergency credit program relevant were extended in apparent conflict with the to farm survival today intent of the legislation. These included loans used to refinance recent land purchases and CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR loans which would have apparently been ANALYSIS OF CREDIT MARKET available from normal lenders. The ambiguity EXPANSION of the loan criteria and the GAO findings A simplified representation of the interraise the possibility that the EE program may relationships between the demand for loans have displaced loans which would have been and the supply of loans from conventional forthcoming from normal lenders rather than sources and from the EE loan program is expanding the credit market. A major purpose presented in Figure 1 . In Figure 1 , Ns repof this research is to empirically examine the resents the supply curve for funds from norallocation of EE funds and the expansionary mal lenders, EEm,, represents the supply of effect of the EE program so as to test the EE funds allocated to a state, and D represents consistency of the operation of the program the total amount of new debt demanded in with the legislative intent.
a year at various interest rates. development of the EE loan program, the of EE funds made available, given identical supply of EE funds, EEma, is affected by de-supply and demand situations otherwise, mand for farm loans, the supply of funds could be due either to differences in the from normal lenders, and on the congres-national allocation of EE funds from year to sional allocation of funds for the EE program. year or to differences in the application of The supply of EE funds is invariant to the the general EE loan guidelines by FmHA adinterest rate on EE loans, i, and the interest ministrators in response to the perceived suprate on EE loans is assumed to be less than ply and demand situation. the rate charged by normal lenders. The inThe discontinuous curves, iecs in Figure 1 , terest rate charged for EE loans nationally represent the combined supply curve for new was based on the cost of government bor-debt from conventional and EE sources. The rowing (United States GAO (a)).
construction of the combined supply curves Figures l.a and 1.b represent the situation assumes that all EE funds made available to a state will be used due to the lower cost of where tightness of credit exists in that normal a state l be used due o lower cost of these funds and that the supply curve for lenders are effectively rationing credit. Credit s unds and a e sul u funds from normal lenders remains substanrationing is defined here to include limits on tially unchanged in the presence of the EE tially unchanged in the presence of the EE individual loans that are extended and the program, due the sma magnitude of EE program, due to the small magnitude of EE denial of loans to potential borrowers with funds relative to the total credit market. the greatest repayment risk who are "crowded In Figure . a, the combined supply curve out" of the market (Melichar). Excess de-and the demand curve for borrowed funds mand exists in the market at all normal lender indicate a total quantity of new debt for the interest rates. Figures l.a and 1.b differ in state equal to Q T . The amount EEma is supthat the EE funds made available to the state plied from EE funds and Q, is supplied from in l.b are approximately twice those made normal lenders. In Figure 1 .a, EEm,, is equal available in l.a. Differences in the amount to QnQT. Qn would also have been supplied by normal lenders under the credit rationing Figure 1 is primarily concerned with the assumption of l.a. The EE program under this impact of the supply of funds from normal scenario can therefore be said to be com-lenders and the EE program on the total pletely expansionary in that the amount of change in debt that occurs with the implefunds supplied by normal lenders is the same, mentation of the EE program. The expanwith or without the EE program, and each sionary effect of EE funding is also impacted dollar of EE funds increases the total amount by the elasticity of demand for borrowed of new debt extended in the state by one funds. The direct effect of EE funding is to dollar.
lower the cost of borrowing. A given decrease In Figure 1 .b, the allocation of EE funds in the cost of debt will cause a greater inis double that in Figure l .a and QT is the crease in the quantity of debt demanded when total new debt extended. QT in l.b is greater the demand for debt is more elastic and the than QT in 1.a, because the marginal cost of impact of EE funding is therefore more exfunds at any total borrowing level is lower pansionary when the demand for borrowed in the situation with the larger EE allocation. funds is more elastic. This can be observed In Figure l .b, with the EE program, Qn2 is in Figure 1 .c by rotating the demand curve provided by normal lenders at an interest rate for funds around the point inlQnl. of in2. Qn2 is equal to QT minus EEma. Qn A model is not sufficiently severe to prevent the market of the following general form was estimated from clearing at the normal lender interest using cross-sectional data for the EE program rate. Borrowers can obtain all of the credit demanded at interest rate i,,. EE loans may years: still be extended in this case, however, con-
(1) DDET = f(EE loans, S, D), sistent with the stated purposes of the pro-(2) EE loans = f(Norm loans, S, D, EE gram, if i,, is considered to be sufficiently national), high that it does not meet the criterion of a d "reasonable" rate of interest.
Comparing 1.c to Figure 1 .a shows that, (3) Norm loans = DDET -EE loans. with identical levels of EE funding, there is Variables are reflected as follows: DDET is more displacement of funds in the case with-the total change in agricultural debt observed out effective credit rationing. There was no in each state and EE program year, EE loans displacement of funds in Figure . a, but dis-is the quantity of EE loan funds extended in placement equal to Qn 2 Qni exists in Figure each state and year, S is a vector of variables I.c.
affecting the supply of loans from normal The greatest displacement of funds from sources in each state and year, D is a vector normal lenders occurs in the scenario de-of variables affecting the demand for agripicted in Figure 1 .d. Figure 1 .d represents cultural loans in each state and year, "Norm the case where there are relatively large loans" is the amount of loans extended by amounts of EE funds, but where credit ra-normal lenders in each state and year, and tioning from normal lenders is not effective.
EE national is the national allocation of EE The displacement of funds from normal lend-funds in each year. ers in Figure 1 .d is greater than that which Theory does not provide a unique specioccurs with smaller amounts of EE funding, fication or specific functional form for the as in Figure 1 .c, and greater than that which system described by equations (1), (2), and occurs when credit rationing is in effect, as (3). This is due both to governmental and in Figure l .b.
non-profit lending institution involvement in the credit market and to the lack of knowl-market can be conducted for the coefficient edge of the underlying utility functions of of EEjt in equation (1). A coefficient not sigborrowers and lenders. Finance theory is nificantly different from zero suggests that helpful, however, in identifying variables that the main effect of the EE loan program was impact the supply of and demand for credit. the displacement of funds from other lenders. The demand for credit is influenced by the A coefficient not significantly different from expected risk and return from borrowing, the one suggests that the EE loan program was cost of borrowing, and internal financing ca-primarily expansionary. The point estimate pacity. The supply of agricultural credit is of the EE loan coefficient is the estimate of affected by the risk and return to lenders the contribution of each EE loan dollar to from agricultural loans, alternative invest-the total change in credit observed in the ment opportunities for agricultural lenders, state. and the cost and availability of funds to lending institutions. Ideally, the analysis would use micro data from borrowers and lenders Risk and Returns for Agricultural at the credit market level of aggregation. Data Loans in this form were not available so the state level of aggregation was employed.
Higher levels of risk exposure in lending affect both the supply of and demand for credit. Barry et al. (1981) (1), the change in total farm on agricultural loans. From the borrower's debt observed in each state and year (DDETit) perspective, the possibility of credit limits is a function of emergency loans extended with higher loan risk implies that higher loan to the state and supply and demand char-risk is associated with smaller credit reserves. acteristics of the farm credit market in each Higher loan risk is therefore associated with state. Supply and demand variables are a decrease in the demand for credit, in order grouped into four categories for the purpose to maintain the level of credit reserves for of discussion: variables related to the risk liquidity purposes (Barry et al., 1981) . and return associated with agricultural loans, Four commonly cited statistics related to the cost of credit, internal financing capacity, loan risk, return to borrowed funds, and credit and characteristics of the supply side of the reserves were included in the estimated farm credit market in each state. The coef-change in debt model; the debt-equity ratio ficient of the emergency loan variable is of of farms, the ratio of net farm income to debt, prime interest in equation (1) and the dis-the percentage change in farm sector equity, cussion of equation (1) begins with that var-and the coefficient of variation of net farm iable.
income. The debt-equity ratio, DEt, was the level of total farm debt divided by farmers' equity, in state i at the beginning of year t.
Economic Emergency Loan
The debt-equity ratio is a commonly used The main focus of the change in debt equa-indicator of solvency (Barry et al., 1979;  tion is on the effect of economic emergency Brigham), and higher values of the ratio inloan allocations on the total change in debt. dicate greater risk and smaller credit reserves, The emergency loan variable, EEit, is defined ceteris paribus. A negative relationship beas the total amount of EE loans extended in tween DEi and the change in debt is therefore state i and year t. EEit included both direct hypothesized. emergency loans from the FmHA to farmers
The ratio of net cash farm income in year (insured loans) and loans from other lenders t--1 to total farm debt at the beginning of that were guaranteed by FmHA under the EE year t was included in the model as NFIDETit. loan program (guaranteed loans). Guaran-Penson and Lins (p. 328) discuss the inverse teed loans represented only a minor part of of this ratio as a measure of the relative the total EE program, representing approxi-burden of debt on cash income. NFIDET in mately .3, 4, 5, and 7 percent of total EE this model is an indicator of the return to loans nationally in 1978 through 1981, re-borrowed funds and the ability to service spectively (USDA, FmHA).
debt from farm income. Higher values of Statistical tests for the expansionary effect NFIDET indicate less loan risk, greater credit of the EE loan program on the farm credit reserves, and a larger return to borrowed funds. A positive relationship between NFI-of internally generated funds should also im-DET and the change in debt is hypothesized. ply greater liquidity and security for potential
The percentage change in farm equity, lenders and should be positively related to PCEQit-1 , is directly related to the amount the supply of loans. of collateral available to secure new loans.
Two sources of internal financing capacity Changes in the value of equity also reflect were included in the change in debt model, expectations about the returns to investments net cash farm income and off-farm income in farm land. Since higher levels of PCEQ of farm families. Net cash farm income, reflect greater (lesser) relative increases (de-NINCi-t_ , is a measure of the absolute amount creases) in credit reserves and better (worse) of net cash farm income in the state, which expectations about returns, a positive rela-sets a theoretical upper limit on the total tionship between PCEQ and the change in amount of farm income available in the state debt is expected.
for internal financing. The off-farm income
The coefficient of variation of net farm variable, OFINCit,. 1 , is the total amount of offincome, CVINCit, was included in the equa-farm income of farm families in each state. tion as an additional measure of lending risk. This variable represents a theoretical upper CVINCit was calculated from observed net limit on the total amount of off-farm income farm income in each state for years t--1 available in a state for internal financing. through t-5. Higher values of CVINC repAn additional variable measuring the relresent greater variability in net income and ative importance of off-farm income in a state, higher business risk in agriculture in a state. OFIAVGi,t_-, was also included in the change The hypothesized relationship between in debt equation. This ratio was defined as CVINC and the change in debt, ceteris par-the ratio of off-farm income in a state in year ibus, is therefore negative.
t divided by a 5-year moving average of net farm income for years t-1 through t--5. This variable reflects the normal long term rela-
Costs of Credit and Returns to
tionship between off-farm income and farm Agricultural Lenders income, by reducing the effects of year-to-
The cost of funds from normal lenders is year variations in net farm income. commonly recognized to be positively reBased on the hypothesized positive supply lated to the supply of funds and negatively response and negative demand response for associated with the demand for funds (Penson higher levels of internal financing capacity, and Lins; Barry et al., 1979) . Since the change the signs of the coefficients of the internal in debt equation in the estimated system financing variables in the change in debt includes both supply and demand variables, equation are dependent on the dominance the sign of the coefficient of the interest rate of the supply or demand effects. variable in the change in debt equation depends on whether the supply or demand effect is dominant. A weighted average inCredit Market Supply Characteristics terest rate from all normal agricultural lendBecause of the cross-sectional focus of the ers would be preferred for the model, but analysis, the size of the farm credit market this was unavailable on a cross-sectional ba-at the beginning of each year, TOTDET t, was sis. The Federal Land Bank interest rate was included in the equation as a scale variable. the best available interest rate for agricultural If all other conditions were equal, the states loans. This interest rate was specified as RA-with the largest farm credit markets would TE 1 t in the change in debt equation.
be expected to experience larger absolute changes in farm debt. The availability of credit from normal Internal Financing Capacity sources is difficult to model cross-sectionally. Internal financing represents a substitute Data on cost of funds for agricultural lending for borrowed capital and higher levels of institutions, alternative investment opporinternal financing capability, ceteris paribus tunities for these institutions, and the availshould result in a lower cost of equity capital ability of funds on a state-by-state basis were and a decrease in the demand for borrowed not available. Differences in the supply of funds. To the extent that internal financing agricultural credit from normal lenders in ability is considered by lenders, higher levels different states could theoretically result from 26 either: (1) differences in nonagricultural in-reasonable rates of interest", and "economic vestment opportunities, available funds for stress" were the most frequently cited conloans, or the cost of funds for similar lending ditions used in justification of the EE loan institutions in different states or (2) differ-program. This examination of the allocation ences in the relative importance of the major of EE funds therefore focuses on the relalending institutions in different states. For tionship between factors related to these conexample, the first type of difference would ditions and the amount of EE funds allocated be related to differences in conditions faced to each state. Variables representing agriculby commercial banks in different states. The tural supply and demand conditions and the second type of difference would be related national allocation of EE funds were included to loan supply differences between commer-in the EE loan allocation equation. The supcial banks and Farm Credit System institutions ply and demand variables included in the and the relative importance of the two types change in debt equation were also included of lenders in the agricultural credit markets in the EE allocation equation. The hypothin different states.
esized effects of these variables on the EE A credit availability proxy, CREDi, _ 1 , based allocation are to be discussed. on recent changes in regional credit availa-
The four indicators of risk and credit cability, was included in the change in debt pacity in the change in debt equation were: equation. The construction of this variable the debt-equity ratio (DEit), the ratio of net is described in the data section of this paper. farm income to debt (NFIDETit), the per-A higher value of CREDi,t_ 1 represents a de-centage change in farmers equity (PCEQi,t_-), creasing trend in credit availability within a and the coefficient of variation of net farm region and a negative relationship between income (CVINCit). It was hypothesized that CRED and the change in debt is therefore greater risk and smaller credit reserves would hypothesized.
be negatively related to the change in debt Agricultural credit market share variables and the predicted signs of the coefficients in for commercial banks, BSHR, and the Farm-the change in debt equation were therefore ers Home Administration, FHSHRi,, were in-negative for DE and CVINC and positive for cluded in the model to represent the effects NFIDET and PCEQ. Since the EE loan program of the institutional structure of the farm credit was developed to provide funds to farmers market on the change in debt. The market under financial stress and those unable to shares of these two institutions were chosen obtain credit from normal sources, the hybecause their structures suggest contrasting pothesized signs of the coefficients of these behavior in their responses to the financial four variables are opposite their expected stress in the farm sector in the EE program signs in the change in debt equation. years. Commercial banks have probably been
The EE loan purpose "to provide funds the most flexibility of the major agricultural when they are unavailable from normal lendlenders in making portfolio adjustments away ers at reasonable rates" suggests a positive from agricultural loans during periods of in-relationship between normal lender interest creased financial stress and risk in agricul-rates and emergency loans. The EE loan rate ture. The FmHA, as the traditional lender of was a national rate, so it would not be exlast resort, would conversely be expected to pected to explain cross-sectional differences maintain or increase its loan activity during in EE allocations, but it may have explanatory periods of increased financial stress and risk. power over time. RATE,t in the emergency The market share variables are specified for loan equation was defined as the land bank the beginning of each program year, and, interest rate divided by the annual average given the hypothesized response of each type emergency loan interest rate. High values of of institution during the EE program years, RATEit indicate that normal lender interest a negative coefficient is expected for BSHR rates were high relative to EE rates and a and a positive coefficient is expected for positive relationship between RATEit and FHSHR.
emergency loans is hypothesized.
The internal financing variables, net farm SPECIFICATION OF THE ECONOMIC income (NINCi,_), off-farm income (OF-EMERGENCY LOAN EQUATION
INCi,t 1 ) and the ratio of off-farm income to average farm income (OFIAVGit_-), were hyThe existence of "tightness of credit", "un-pothesized to have a negative effect on the availability of funds from normal lenders at demand for new debt and a positive effect on the supply of new debt from normal lend-explained in the data section of this paper, ers. With respect to the emergency loan equa-EE loan allocations were converted from a tion, higher internal financing capability fiscal year to a calendar year basis for the should be negatively related to the allocation estimation. National calendar year allocations of EE funds. Higher internal financing ca-for 1978 through 1981 were .7, 2.9, 2.0, pacity should increase the likelihood of funds and .9 billion dollars, respectively. Dummy being available either internally or from nor-variables for 1979 through 1981 (D79, D80, mal lenders, ceteris paribus, and EE funds D81) were included in the EE loan equation should therefore be less necessary, given the and 1978 was used as the base year. Based purposes of the EE loan program.
on the pattern of national allocations; posiThe size of the total farm credit market in tive coefficients were expected for all dummy a state, TOTDETit, should be positively related variables. to the allocation of EE funds due to the scale effect. With all other conditions being equal, DATA AND ESTIMATION larger allocations of EE funds should be positively related to farm credit market size.
The system of equations specified for the The credit availability proxy, CREDit, is estimation were: directly related to the "tightening of credit" NFIDET condition specified in the EE program docPCEQEt_, Cf(Norm , RATE,, NINCDEi, umentation. Since a higher value of CRED OFINC,-,_, OFIAVGt , TOTDETI, indicates a decrease in credit availability, a CREDIt, BSHR, FHSHR, D79, D80
CREDi,t_l, BSHR.t, FHSHRiV D79, D80, positive relationship between CRED and the D81, El ) allocation of EE funds is expected.
NFIDET, Given the hypothesis that commercial banks PCEQt CVINC,, RATE, NINCt-, would be more restrictive than other lenders OFINCPC 1 OFIAVGTE, NTOTDET 1 in making new loans or restructuring existing OFINC , OFIAVGiHS , E2T), and debt during the EE program years, a positive (6) Norm loa, B= DDET FH EE2), relationship between BSHR and the EE loan N allocation is expected. The effect of a high Eli and E2it are random error terms and all FmHA market share on emergency loans is other variables are as previously defined. less clear. A high FmHA market share may Data for the state EE loan obligations were indicate that a larger proportion of farmers from FmHA "Status of Loan and Grant Obin a state have experienced financial diffi-ligations" (USDA, FmHA). This source reports culties and that FHSHR would be positively loan obligations by state biannually during related to EE loans. Conversely, if FmHA was the federal fiscal year, with a 6-month submore flexible than other lenders in restruc-total as of March 31 and a fiscal year total as turing existing debt, a high FmHA market of September 30 for each year. Since most share would be negatively related to EE loans, other variables in the model were on a calIn addition to the supply and demand var-endar year basis, calendar year totals for EE iables discussed above, the amount of farm loans were estimated by interpolating the credit from normal sources, Norm loans in data for September 30 to March 1. Half of equations (2) and (3), should also have af-the loan obligations in each of these periods fected the EE fund allocation. After account-was allocated to each of the 2 years spanned ing for farm credit supply and demand by the reporting period. determinants, states that experienced higher Land Bank interest rates and market share levels of "normal funding" would be ex-data were from the Farm Credit Administrapected to have less need for EE funding. Since tion "Characteristics of Federal Land Bank Norm loans is an endogenous variable, how-Loans," "Nonreal Estate Farm Debt," and ever, and the EE allocation equation is not "Real Estate Farm Debt." Emergency loan identified, the direct impact of Norm loans interest rates were obtained from the Farmers on EE funding is not measurable. The reduced Home Administration (Ischer) . Farm income form of the EE equation was used to measure statistics were from the "Economic Indicathe impact of the exogenous variables on the tors of the Farm Sector" (USDA, ERS (c)). EE loan allocation.
The off-farm income statistic was from the The final explanatory variables in the emer-Bureau of the Census 1979 Farm Finance gency loan equation account for the effects Survey. This figure was available only for of changes in the national allocation of EE 1979 EE , and 1978 EE , 1980 EE , and 1981 values were funds on the individual state allocations. As approximated be indexing the 1979 figure  28 by personal income statistics for the United squares estimation procedure (Pindyck and States over the other years.
Rubinfield, p. 227). Heteroscedasticity asThe credit availability index was con-sociated with the TOTDET variable was destructed from data reported in "Farm Real tected in the change in debt model using the Estate Market Developments" (USDA, ERS Glejser technique (Maddala, p. 262 ) and the (b)). This source provides the percentage of appropriate transformation was made to correporters in each of ten production regions rect for heteroscedasticity. that thought that credit availability had increased, decreased, or changed little during ESTIMATION RESULTS the previous 6 months. Percentages are provided for March and October of each year.
The results from the reduced form emerThe construction of the proxy variable was gency loan equation and the second stage as follows: INCR 3 , and INCRot represent the change in debt equation are presented in percentage of reporters reporting an increase Table 1 . The emergency loan allocation model in credit availability for the 6 months ending results indicate that three of the four variain March and October of year t. DECR 3 , and bles related to loan risk and credit capacity DECRot, represent the percentage reporting had statistically significant effects on the ala decrease for the periods ending in March location of EE funds. States with higher agand October of year t. The variable CRED, gregate debt-to-equity ratios received more was defined as: EE funds, after accounting for other effects.
States with higher levels of farm income rel-
ative to debt and with greater relative in-
This variable shows the net (decrease-inThis variable shows the net (decrease-in- creases in equity in the previous year received found to be statistically significant and negsmaller EE allocations after accounting for atively related to the change in debt. These other factors. A general statement of the im-results indicate that less new debt was expact of these three variables is that greater tended in the presence of higher historical amounts of EE funds were provided in states business risk, higher levels of off-farm inwhere the prospects of receiving loans from come, and a recent decreasing trend in credit normal lenders were poorer. availability. Net farm income in the previous Two variables related to alternative financ-year, the size of the farm credit market, and ing possibilities were statistically significant the FmHA market share of agricultural debt in the EE allocation equation. Counter to the were all found to be statistically significant suggested hypothesis, the level of off-farm and positively related to the change in debt. income of farm families in year t--1 was These results indicate that more new debt positively related to EE loan amounts in year was extended in the presence of higher farm t. The coefficient of the OFIAVG variable, income, larger credit markets, and a greater however, indicates that smaller amounts of importance of FmHA as normal lender. EE funds were extended in states where offfarm income was normally of greater importance relative to farm income.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS The positive and significant coefficient of the commercial bank market share variable
The stated purposes of the EE loan program indicates that more EE funds were provided were to provide credit to farmers facing ecoto states in which commercial banks had a nomic stress, tight credit conditions, and the larger share of the farm credit market. This unavailability of funds from normal lenders supports the hypothesis that banks were more at reasonable rates of interest. These justifirestrictive than other normal lenders during cations of the EE program suggest that the the study period and then more EE funds intent of the EE program was to expand the were consequently needed.
supply of credit available to farmers. The The only dummy variable for national loan ambiguity of the EE loan criteria, lack of allocations that was significant was for 1979, specific guidelines, and difficulty in enforcthe year of the largest EE loan allocations.
ing the general criteria at local levels raised The remaining independent variables in the the possibility that EE allocations would not allocation model were insignificant at the 10 be consistent with congressional intent and percent level.
would displace funds from normal lenders The estimation of the change in debt equa-rather than expanding the credit market. A tion resulted in a coefficient for the EE loan General Accounting Office examination of variable of.97. This coefficient is significantly individual EE loans made during the early different from zero at the 99 percent confi-years of the EE program provided some evidence level and is not significantly different dence that this had occurred. than one at the same confidence level. The This analysis examined the allocation of point estimate of the coefficient indicates that emergency loans and the expansionary effect each dollar of EE funds resulted in an increase of the EE program at the state level. While in the total change in debt equal to 97 cents this level of aggregation does not allow conand hence that the program was almost totally clusions to be made regarding the individual expansionary. The 99 percent confidence in-loans, it does provide information on whether terval for the EE coefficient is .09 < P < 1.84 EE funds were made available in areas that and the 90 percent confidence interval is .41 appeared to be in the greatest need, in the < p < 1.53. The change in debt equation context of the program, and whether the farm was also estimated with actual values of EE credit market was expanded by the program. loans used as a regressor rather than predicted
The empirical findings reported here provalues. The point estimate (.96) in this vide evidence that factors indicating ecoregression was almost identical to that re-nomic stress, tightness of credit, and the ported in Table 1 and a smaller standard error inability to obtain funds from normal sources of the estimate resulted in a higher t-ratio were significant determinants of the alloca-(3.26) for the coefficient.
tion of economic emergency loans. Although The coefficients of variation of farm in-variations in EE funding in different states come, the level of off-farm income, and the were not completely explained and the decredit availability proxy variable were all terminants of individual loans were not di-rectly addressed, a general statement that EE uted to their current financial stress by defunds were allocated in greater amounts to creasing their solvency. Of course, neither areas experiencing the conditions cited in situation would have occurred had farm insupport of the EE program can be made based come and equity increased in the post proon the empirical analysis.
gram years rather than declined. The results of the estimation of the change An expansionary emergency credit program in debt equation indicated that the EE loan requires an improvement in financial conprogram was primarily expansionary. This ditions to be a long-term success. If condifinding is consistent with the conclusion that tions improve, some farm operators who more EE funds were provided in states where would have failed may have been able to the restriction of credit from normal lenders continue operations in the long run. If conwas more likely.
ditions deteriorate, the failure of operators The empirical findings regarding the ex-is only delayed and the direct cost of the pansionary and allocation characteristics of attempt is the cost of the loan defaults. the program are positive in the sense that A non-expansionary credit program, used they indicate that the program was admin-to refinance existing debt to reduce annual istered in accordance with congressional in-debt servicing requirements and to displace tent, but negative in that they indicate that higher cost new credit from other lenders, the program may have contributed to the improves shortrun liquidity and cash flow current financial stress faced by farmers. In without decreasing solvency. Cash flow imthe case of loans provided to farm operators provements from this type of program may who would have otherwise failed during the not be sufficient to save operators in the worst loan period, the failure was probably only financial condition. The emergency credit exdelayed at the expense of EE loan defaults tended is still at risk in the face of declines which will ultimately be borne by the tax-in income and equity. The risk is less, howpayers. To the extent that EE loans expanded ever, because the program would not dethe credit use of farm operators who could crease the solvency of borrowers and credit have survived the 1978-81 period without will not have been extended to operators EE debt, the EE program may have contrib-facing the greatest stress.
